Incident At Bhopal
To
examine the events contributing to
the tragedy at Bhopal, India and their
repercussions and to draw conclusions
based on these events.
What
Happened at
Bhopal? Reading newspaper and magazine articles written immediately
following
the events at Bhopal, it is apparent that it took some time for
authorities
to determine the causes of the industrial accident. Speculation
seems to have
run wild for a time following the accident. Drawing from later
statistics and
information seems to be a more reliable method of determining the
most likely
scenario. Where various alternate feasible possibilities have been
presented,
we will try to include the most likely. At approximately midnight
on
December 3, 1984, an unexpected chemical reaction took place in a
Union Carbide
of India Limited storage tank. The storage tank contained
methyl isocyanate,
(hereafter referred to as MIC) a toxic gas used in the
process of a pesticide
called Sevin.(1) As part of the distilling process
there was an extremely high
concentration of chloroform present. This caused
corrosion of the tank. The tank
being made of iron provided a catalyst for
the reaction. A large amount of water
was also introduced, approximately
120-240 gallons, which in combination with
the chemical, generated enough
heat to start the reaction. The runaway reaction
released an uncontrollable
amount of heat and this resulted in 30-40 tons of the
gas being vaporized and
spread over approximately 30 square miles, killing
thousands of people and
injuring hundreds of thousands.(2) The lack of
information on MIC in 1984
made it a very toxic and difficult to control
substance, according to Meryl
H. Karol of the University of Pittsburgh’s
Graduate School of Public
Health. He says, "Although nominally a liquid at
room temperature, methyl
isocyanate evaporates so quickly from an open container
that it easily turns
into a colorless, odorless highly flammable and reactive
gas... I would
hesitate having it in a laboratory." He also quotes the OHSA
standard for
exposure to MIC during an eight-hour day as 0.02 parts per million,
"far
lower than what many Bhopal residents were exposed to."(3) THE
HEALTH
AFFECTS of exposure to MIC is disastrous. At low levels, MIC
causes eyes to
water and results in damage to the cornea. At higher
concentrations, muscles
constrict, and the bronchial passages have the
equivalent of a severe asthma
attack.(3) Most of the deaths in India were due
to this. Dr. Jeffrey P. Koplan,
Assistant Director of Public Health
Practice at the Centers for Disease Control
in Atlanta, who went to Bhopal to
render assistance, said, "There was edema,
substantial destruction...of
alveolar walls, ... a ulcerative bronchiolus..."
among patients at the
severely crowded hospitals.(4) Serious damage to the
central nervous system
after three to four weeks, including paralysis, and
psychological problems
have also been a result.(3) The long-term affects of MIC
exposure are equally
disastrous. According to the Indian Council of Medical
Research, at least
50,000 people are still suffering and new chronic cases of
asthma keep
showing up as the population ages and 39% of the surrounding
population have
some form of severe respiratory impairment.(5) Most of them will
suffer for
the rest of their lives.(6) It is a conservative estimate that 5
people die
every week as a result of the Bhopal accident.(7) Another
consideration is
that in a social class that maintains a living through physical
labor,
inability to perform results in starvation.(8) Affects on women
were
profound. Out of 198 women living within 10 miles of the facility, 100
had
abnormal uterine bleeding.(1,5) Of the local women who were pregnant
before the
accident, 43% miscarried and 14% of the babies carried to term
died within a
month. Socially, these women are considered unwanted by
potential husbands
because reproductive disorders are so commonplace that
they are seen as
sterile.(5) It is unknown whether chromosomal damage will
affect future
generations.(8) TOTAL EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT are not yet
known.
Approximately 1,600 animals died on the first and second days
after the
incident. This was a terrible environmental health risk. Eventually
this problem
was solved by digging a giant one-acre mass grave. There was
also damage to some
vegetation, animal and fish species, but not to others.
The Indian Council of
Agricultural Research is studying this.(1) A
VARIETY OF FAILURES were
contributing factors in this lethal cloud of
chemicals descending on the
helpless, uninformed public. These failures
include design failures, maintenance
failures, operations failures, emergency
response failures, communications
failures, governmental failures and last
but not least management failures. In
1982, a safety audit by the Union
Carbide parent company revealed a number of
safety problems. The conditions
that did not measure up were problems with the
manual controls of the MIC
feed tank, unreliable gauges and valves, and
insufficient training of the
operators. The Union Carbide of India division
claimed to have fixed all of
these, but management never had auditors go back
and confirm. Another
inherent problem is that the storage tanks were too large.
They had a
capacity of 15,000 gallons. The smallest amount of water introduced
into the
system would cause an exothermic reaction such as the one which
occurred, on
an extremely large scale, instead of on a smaller scale if the
tanks did not
have such a high volume.(1) The parent company, according to Mr.
Jackson
Browning, Union Carbide’s Director of Health, Safety and
Environmental
Affairs, did not even have detailed plans of the Indian
plant, and the design of
safety procedures was left up to local managers.(9)
When the vapor was released,
it was released into a highly populated area.
The grounds in the immediate
vicinity were completely surrounded by vast
numbers of shacks and homemade
temporary dwellings, some of them right up
against the fence line.(10) This was
perfectly legal. The local government
does not enforce zoning laws. The local
government had actually had water and
electricity installed in over 80% of these
dwellings.(1,13) There was no
buffer zone.(11) The local population was
completely uninformed concerning
the hazards involved with living so close to a
chemical plant. Had the
general population been informed that in case of an
accident they should
breathe through a simple wet cloth, thereby preventing any
harm from MIC, it
is likely fewer deaths and injuries would have occurred.
Instead, once
awareness set in, hysteria prevailed, with people running to get
away. Noone
knew to cover their faces with a wet cloth. One small piece of
information
would have made a great difference. (8) Another factor to consider
is that
the Indian government insisted as a term of allowing Union Carbide to
do
business there, low qualified natives had to be employed at the facility.
Many
of them were friends or relatives of the government officials, instead
of the
qualified employees who should have been working there.(12) The local
state
government had no oversight or regulation of the facility. This was
likely due
to lack of technical knowledge and lack of institutional ability
to implement
environmental control laws. Union Carbide took advantage of
India’s less
expensive and laxer safety standards.(12) The accident may not
have occurred had
proper maintenance been performed. The failure of the
refrigeration equipment
which should have kept the temperature low, so that
the MIC did not vaporize,
went completely unnoticed by unskilled maintenance
workers.(13) This
refrigeration equipment was supposed to keep the MIC close
to 32° F, instead it
reached approximately 200° F.(8) It had not been working
for five months.(14)
In addition, a labor report shows that the
maintenance department used a jumper
line installed for cleaning purposes and
that same cleaning water line may have
been the source of the water injected
into the MIC storage tank, causing the
accident.(15) The Operations
department played a role in the disaster as well. A
vent scrubber, which was
designed to neutralize escaping gas was turned off.
There was a flare
tower, designed to burn off escaping gases. It was also turned
off. Noone has
an explanation why.(13) The lack of emergency response was a
contributing
factor. The sirens at the facility were turned off. Noone knows
why. The
Bhopal community had no emergency plan. When the hospitals flooded with
tens
of thousands of seriously ill and dying patients, it was nearly
impossible
for them to receive medical care.(4) RESULTING from the incident
at Bhopal is
among other things, increased spending on safety and
environmental precautions.
In 1984, safety represented 1% of spending. It
has now increased to over 4%.(16)
It is difficult to estimate whether
this represents effective spending, but the
increased revenues devoted to
safety certainly cannot hurt. Companies have begun
attempting to design
plants that are "idiot proof" as well as "vandal
proof" and are starting to
realize the need for back-up equipment, since they
will be blamed in
instances of disaster.(12) Public opinion is an influencing
factor in the
U.S., but abroad, it is not very effective in motivating big
companies to
change their safety practices. However corporate banking DOES
influence
international business. Since the Bhopal incident, banks have begun
turning
down loans over environmental concerns. This has to do with concern
over
liability and monetary loss instead of any humanitarian concern, but it
has the
same end result.(16) Companies that show a poor track record in
regard to safety
do not get to have the business opportunities that they
would otherwise have.
The World Bank insists that projects receiving its
loans comply with safety
standards. This includes complying with safer
processes to replace more
hazardous ones.(13) In 1985, Dr. Gareth Green of
John’s Hopkins University
School of Public Health and Hygiene, remarked
to the Journal of the American
Medical Association, "I think we need more
knowledge about the location and
quantities of hazardous substances around
the country. There needs to be
developed plans for dealing with problems
should they occur."(4) Dr. Green
could not have foreseen the future any more
clearly if he were psychic. It took
awhile, but in 1992, OSHA enacted the
Process Safety Management Standard. PSM
covers such planning. IT MAY BE
CONCLUDED that chemical process plants should be
located nowhere near
residential areas, whether in the U.S. or abroad. Strategic
site location
could have eliminated the occurrence at Bhopal almost entirely.
The
United Nations should have an equivalent department serving an
OSHA-like
function in third-world countries, with trade sanctions imposed on
those who do
not comply. The U.N. has been involved in many less humanitarian
ventures
recently. Why not something purely protective in nature? It may also
be
concluded that the value American chemical companies place on human life
depends
largely on where the person lives and the penalties involved when
lives are
lost.
Bibliography
Avoiding Future Bhopals: In the
Aftermath of Catastrophe, What Can We Learn
From History’s Worst
Industrial Accident?" ENVIRONMENT, Vol. 27, Sept 1985,
p. 6-13.
(2)"Environmental Surprise: Expecting the Unexpected." Kates,
William.
ENVIRONMENT, Vol. 38, March 1996, p. 6-7. (3)"Fallout From a
Chemical
Catastrophe." Peterson, Ivar. SCIENCE NEWS, Vol. 126, Dec 15,
1984, p. 372.
(4)"After Coping With Crisis, Medicine Ponders Sequelae."
Marwick, Dr.
Charles. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol.
253, April 12, 1985.
(5)"Persistently Toxic: The Union Carbide Accident In
Bhopal Continues to
Harm." Mukerjee, Modhusree. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Vol.
272, June 1995, p. 16.
(6)"The Fallout From Bhopal." Lepkowski, William.
SCIENCE DIGEST. Vol. 94,
Jan 1986, p. 52. (7)"Union Carbide Officials
Face Prosecution." Kumar,
Sanjay. NEW SCIENTIST, Vol. 138, May 1, 1993,
p. 8. (8)"BHOPAL: 15th
Anniversary." WWW.Corpwatch.org/Bhopal.
(9)"Bhopal: The Lesson Sinks In."
THE ECONOMIST, Vol. 295, June 22, 1985,
p. 91. (10)"Permanent Scars of the
Bhopal Catastrophe." DISCOVER. Vol. 7,
April 1986, p. 9. (11)"What We Can
Learn From Bhopal."Speth, James.
ENVIRONMENT, Vol. 27, Jan/Feb 1985, p 15.
(12)"Gassed in Bhopal." THE
ECONOMIST, Vol. 293, Dec 15, 1984, p. 12-14.
(13)"Poisoned Legacy." THE
ECONOMIST, Vol. 293, Dec 15, 1984, p. 77-78.
(14)"Union Carbide; Not Us." THE
ECONOMIST, Vol. 294, March 23, 1985, p.
78-79. (15)"New Labor Report on
Bhopal Plant." ENVIRONMENT, Vol. 27, Sept.
1985, p. 23. (16)"Bhopal: Ten
Years On." THE ECONOMIST, Vol. 333, Dec 1994,
p. 78-79.